Property trusts on a tightrope
By Robert Gottliebsen
PORTFOLIO POINT: Perceived value in listed property trusts has all but evaporated, and many could be heading for capital raisings … or the wall.
Today I want to share with you a journey I have experienced, which started with me being an enthusiast of depressed property trusts but ended with a rather stark conclusion: that many property trusts will be required to raise capital and that the latest upward thrust in their stock has gone way too far.
While there are no certainties, we are looking at the likelihood of substantial future property writedowns. But that’s getting ahead of ourselves.
The journey started in the middle of last week as I was researching to write last week’s commentary on safe income strategies. I saw that there seemed to be incredible value in listed property trusts so I decided that in the following seven days I would look more closely at this sector and write about it in today’s Eureka Report.
It’s now about 10 days since I made that decision. As I began to research the area, I enlisted the help of one the best Australian listed property trust analysts, JP Morgan’s Rob Stanton. His research material was showing that while there was bad news ahead in listed property trusts, the market had taken the stocks back too far.
So my initial plan for this week was to use his commentary as a basis to suggest that there was good value in some trusts. That value had been created by the excessive market falls caused, in part, because Australian superannuation and index funds have been lending their clients’ script to international hedge funds who had decided that Australian property trusts were overpriced. (Australian superannuation funds still think this is in the interest of their members, when it is clearly not in clients’ interests).
The hedge funds began a concerted program to short sell Australian property trusts on a massive scale. As the fall in the property trusts proceeded it was multiplied by the selling of funds that had invested in this area because they were suffering substantial redemptions – a classic vicious cycle.
These cycles can reverse dramatically, as we saw with the big rises in leading listed property trusts. Once the property trusts started to rise, the shorters began to cover and the cycle went into reverse and suddenly the game was totally changed. Some stocks rose more than 20%. I looked again at the JP Morgan-Stanton research and realised that the discounts that he had been highlighting had all but disappeared.
Then on Thursday night (July 24), Business Spectator’s Alan Kohler, Robert Gottliebsen and Stephen Bartholomeusz (the KGB) interrogated Mirvac chief executive Greg Paramor, and he basically confirmed some of the base assumptions of the JP Morgan-Stanton research: We are going to see a race to raise capital by a number of listed property trusts and only those that are very fast will get their money.
So let’s look at what Rob Stanton’s research is showing us.
Most property trusts set their property values on the basis of what are called “cap rates”, and currently in the market for commercial property these cap rates are about 6.4% for retail; 6.5% for commercial and 7.4% for industrial. According to Stanton, a rise of a quarter of a percentage point in these cap rates would trigger a 6.2% fall in the equity values of listed property trusts that were leveraged at 40%.
If you exclude Westfield, which is valued on a different basis, a few weeks back the sharemarket for listed property trusts was pricing the stocks on the basis that the that cap rates would rise by more than 2% and that listed property trusts would have to write back about $41 billion in assets. Such an event would be as bad or worse than the 1990–92 property crash and would send some property trusts to the wall.
Stanton said this market correction was too great and that he believed that cap rates would only need to rise by 0.8–1%. He estimated this would trigger writedowns of about $14 billion or about one third of what the market was assuming. This is heady material. So how do listed property trusts and their valuers arrive at the current range of values?
The current cap rates that are used to value property trusts are based on actual sales that have been going through. Although turnover has been low, almost $2 billion of property has changed hands at these sort of cap rates, so the valuers can point to a genuine market. However, credit is simply not available to fund the substantial volume of property likely to be put on the market over the next couple of years.
But during the next six months a number of property trusts who want to sell property might be lucky and secure a good price. But the current cap rates are simply not sustainable, with credit very tight and interest rates around 9–10%, even for good properties. Paramor estimates that cap rates will rise between 0.5% and 1%, which is not that different from the JP Morgan/Stanton estimate of 0.8–1%.
When the property trusts were not far from their bottom, Stanton estimated that a number of key stocks were still at a substantial discount to his net asset values (adjusted for a cap rate rise) even though the Stanton net asset values were substantially less than those that were calculated from current valuations.
And so for a number of stocks including Goodman, Mirvac, Dexus and ING Office Fund, there appeared to be good value for those prepared to ride through the tough times. (My superannuation fund has a small parcel of ING Office fund so I was happy.)
JP Morgan says there is a substantial difference between the current crisis and 1992 when there were substantial surpluses of property in many sectors. This time around no surplus exists and increasing rents will help fund an increase in the cap rates so requiring a lesser writedown. Nevertheless it will not be a pleasant situation.
Below I have taken the Stanton estimates of net asset values and compared them with Thursday’s sharemarket price. I must emphasise that these net asset values are not those that any of the trusts would agree to because they are based on cap rates that are 0.8–1% above the current values they are using. A table prepared 10 days ago would have displayed substantially lower stock prices with much bigger discounts.
Stanton believes that the likely fall in a wide range of property values means that for most funds it is not prudent to be leveraged beyond 35%. And so he lists a number of stocks that are geared above 35% and estimates how much they need to raise to bring their gearing down to that level.
I think Stanton would be the first to agree that this is indicative or guidepost data, and that listed property trusts can reduce their leverage by other means and some trusts can handle leverage above 35% because they have blue-chip properties that will hold value or ready access to loan capital.
The biggest amount that would need to be raised is, of course, Centro Retail ($2.9 billion), but that will be a part of a total reconstruction and Centro has leverage with its bankers because they need the shopping centre management contracts to be valuable so the banks cannot pull the plug. The next biggest is GPT, which can slash its gearing exposures by walking away from its European assets and taking a big loss.
Rather than raise equity it would make more sense for many of the trusts to sell properties given that properties are currently selling at what appears to be inflated values. I must emphasise again that the JP Morgan-Stanton numbers are approximate and are guides to the areas in which boards will need to be on alert if we are to see a fall in property values as a part in rise in cap rates.
On this basis, Stanton calculated the following amounts would need to be raised by trusts to return to a gearing of 35%: APN UK European Fund ($275 million); Babcock & Brown Communities Group ($81 million); Babcock & Brown Japan Trust ($414 million); Charter Hall ($67 million); Galileo Japan Trust ($198 million); Goodman ($1.4 billion); General Property Trust ($2.6 billion); ING Industrial Fund ($885 million); ING Real Estate Community Living ($318 million); ING Office Fund ($163 million); Macquarie Country Wide Trust ($1.1 billion); Macquarie DDR Trust ($683 million); Mirvac Industrial Trust ($168 million); Macquarie Office Fund ($904 million); Mirvac Real Estate Investment ($137 million); Tishman Speyer Office Fund ($402 million); Valad ($308 million). The total, including Centro retail, is about $13 billion.
I must emphasise that not all the trusts will need to go 35% gearing and some will achieve the required gearing reduction by selling assets. But those that need to change their gearing will need to use this rally in the market to achieve their goals.
Meanwhile some funds are geared under 35%. These include Bunnings Warehouse; Challenger Diversified, Carindale, CFS Retail Property, Dexus, Mirvac Group, Stockland and Westfield.
A large number of people buy the listed trusts for income. Higher interest rates will mean that distributions will be reduced, particularly for those funds that have high leverage. And those that are stapled to trading activities will need to lower their payouts, as Mirvac has shown.
Over the past 10 days, because of the extensive hedge fund shorting, the listed property trusts reversal was in fact bigger than the banks’. But if the listed property trust recovery is unsustainable then I think that Australian banks will also find it difficult to sustain the levels of their recovery because they too will be affected if there is a decline in property values as a part of a rise in cap rates.
This situation is of course long overdue. It will put under the microscope the property trust structure that stapled property development businesses with property management and investments. The institutional unit holders put great pressure on the combined companies to distribute all their earnings to lift yields. But this was not in the interests of the development businesses and led to greater gearing than should have taken place.
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